Sunday, November 18, 2012

Into the Niger Delta

I have befriended quite a few people from Nigeria over the years and they have told me a lot of things about Nigeria including Nigerian film industry, corruption, business scams, rubber production, and oil. But before watching the documentary 'Into the Niger Delta', I had no idea about the astronomical level of oil spillage the delta at the hands of the oil companies operating all the refineries. Over the past fifty years, the oil spillage into the Niger Delta has added up to 1.5 million tons of oil, which is fifty times the pollution caused by Exxon Valdez tanker disaster in Alaska in 1989 (source: blacknovemberthemovement.com).

One of the first things I mentioned about Nigeria was the Nigerian film industry, and ironically, the film industry has joined hands with some Americans from showbiz to turn the pressing issue of oil spillage into a social movement. Needless to say, the movement is doing a great job at the moment in raising wide-scale awareness about an environmental issue which has become crucial to the human rights of the people of Nigeria affected by the oil spillage. The pollution of the Niger Delta has resulted in dangerous carcinogenic substances contaminating the water, amounting up to 900 times above the WHO guidelines. The contamination of water has killed the marine life in the Delta and severely affected the livelihoods of the people residing in the areas who depended primarily on fisheries for their dietary needs and income generating activities. The oil seepage into the soil has also depleted any supplies of clean drinking water, as a result of which many Nigerians especially children are becoming sick and getting kidney diseases. The issue calls for the attention of international leaders to make oil companies like Shell accountable for their actions.

Since 40 % of the Nigerian oil is exported to the US, and Nigeria is one of the five top oil providers to the US (supplying up to 0.8 million barrels per day), the movement against these oil companies has called for the resolution no. 121 to be passed in Congress. The resolution will recognize the importance of the wetland and coastal ecosystem in the Niger Delta, and may result in the rehabilitation of the damaged infrastructure. The movement is being conducted through presenting the whole situation of the Niger Delta to different universities and global leaders (more recently at the UN plaza in New York).

The work being done by the current members of the movement is commendable, but I wonder about one thing; if the core issue being addressed or not. The things I mentioned about Nigeria included a corrupt state apparatus as well, and it goes without saying here that if the Nigerian government had been proactive in safeguarding the environmental rights of the people living in the Niger Delta, the oil companies would not have been able to do this level of damage today. One can argue then that the government gets money for these multi national oil corporations to operate in Nigeria, and it spurs economic growth- creating jobs and economic activities in the region, so the Nigerian government does not have any incentive to stop them. The answer lies in the weak government institutions facilitating these corporations. Since there is a lack of understanding of the factors affecting the livelihoods of the citizens of Nigeria at the hands of environmental and ecological disasters, the process of development itself will remain disrupted. For the same reason, I believe, that movement against the oil companies should be Nigeria-centric in such a way that the international leaders are urged to mobilize resources to strengthen the government institutions, and provide legal advice to the local communities to be self aware of their rights. This approach, coupled with the external pressure by means of resolutions like H.Con.Res 121, will galvanize the process of sustainable change vis-a-vis issues of human rights and development. 


Informal Social Institutions for Development: Idirs in Ethipoia


Ethiopia is an agrarian country where agriculture accounts for almost 85% of the total employment. Only 3.6% GDP is dedicated to health and life expectancy is 56 years (2012). 38.7% of the population lives below the poverty line1. This indicates that the majority of the population is unhealthy, poorly employed and very vulnerable to external shocks. In the absence of any form of basic safety nets, we can expect many Ethiopians to resort to debilitating coping strategies by undermining the importance of health, education. etc. Thus, there is a strong need for the provision of safety nets in these communities.

In the absence of insurance markets, Ethiopians found the establishment of informal community funeral associations, Idirs, an effective way to share risks. Idir guarantees socio-economic insurance to families of its members in the events of death and funerals through cash or labor contributions by the Idir members.

Idirs are socio-economic traditions that are both informal and bottom up thus enabling wider participation all over Ethiopia. They are so widespread today that they can be established by any community. They allow multiple memberships to diversify risks. Though the participation is mostly dominated by males, females can form their own Idirs as well. Idir, in fact, is becoming a critical source of social stability at a time when deaths from HIV/AIDS are increasing at an alarming rate among the Ethiopian youth. With risings mortality rates, Idirs guarantee victims respectful burials and ensure financial support to their families. Idirs have well defined rules and obligations, election system, membership status and hierarchies. In an environment where little or no markets exist to support the poor against shocks, association with Idirs resembles buying life insurance for their families.

Association with NGOs:

Though the city government has established Idir councils, more recently, NGO’s have been interested in capitalizing Idirs to achieve their greater goals for Ethiopia’s development. Because of cross cultural nature and widespread integration, Idirs form a perfect choice for the NGOs to channel their development work plans. Local NGOs and other organizations like ACORD or Catholic Relief Services (CRS) are already capitalizing this informal community network for broader development goals such as health, education, HIV prevention. The advantages to engage funeral societies into broader development activities are substantial, however, one ought to give more thought before using them as a channel to reach ‘broad development goals’. 

If large investments are to be made within the Idirs to reach development goals, then its shortcomings should be considered as well. For starters, the informal nature would lack the formal enforcement capacity that a typical development project mandates in terms of meeting deadlines, activities, etc. On the same lines, there will be limited levels within and, differing levels across Idirs with respect to their financial, human and institutional capacity as they evolve to meet larger objectives.


What becomes of conflicts between the beneficiaries of the Idir i.e. the entire community which holds its membership and the beneficiaries of a specific development program? For example, if a project is targeted particularly towards farmers then one also needs to consider the consequences for the unskilled laborers working within the same community. If women rights are the development mandate, NGOs would face trouble in working through an Idir that has pre-established male leaders who exercise more influence and decision making power than the women. Thus in this way, the limited nature of Idir also serves as its own drawback.

Conclusion:

For small-scale community based projects, Idirs may be an ideal solution as they stimulate discussion within the local villagers, have a participatory spirit which encourages sustainability and social cohesion. However there is danger in using these indigenous institutions as an avenue for development. There is very little empirical research on how their functioning would unfold if we use them to implement development initiatives. Also, we know very little about how these associations function in times of drought when the need to inject NGO money is high but at the same individualism over community support is preferred. A role that some NGOs can play would be to enable them to be more self-reliant and sustainable. Or they could be used a channel only for reaching out and sensitizing the communities about development interventions. The former can be done through trainings on monitoring and evaluation, reporting, etc. so that the results of Idirs’ work are recorded and advocated for. However, if we proceed without proper research about the possible consequences of any intervention, we may find ourselves with a defunct informal social institution.




Kerry-Lugar Bill: Civilian Development or the Bill of Demands?

My previous post was about the disbursement of international aid to developing countries, and this one is about a unique situation faced by Pakistan vis-a-vis its bilateral relations with the US and the provision of foreign aid in the wake of these relations. US has been providing aid to Pakistan since 2001 amounting up to $15 billion, out of which $10 billion was in the form of military aid. Kerry-Lugar bill stems from the 'Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act 2009' and it earmarks $7.5 billion for five years (2009-2014) for civil development projects. The bill has been passed by both the House of Representatives and the Senate and is endorsed by President Obama.

Although the bill stated the use of aid for civil development projects, it is largely believed that the provision is linked with security related matters and the common objective of the two countries to combat terrorism. The bill faced wide scale criticism from the Pakistani political opposition and military and was being termed as the 'bill of demands'. One can ask the question that why the criticism when Pakistani government is getting more money, that too for development projects. The reason the critics give is the conditionality attached with the foreign aid. Some of the prominent tenets of the bill are that the Pakistani military will be subservient to the civilian government, the two governments will rigorously engage in their common war against terrorism, Pakistani government will take an active role in development programs in order to bolster economic efforts and so on.

                                Former Pakistani Foreign Minister on Kerry-Lugar Bill


The critics of the bill maintain that it is the manifestation of interfering with a nation states sovereignty and integrity to be told what to do, especially when it comes to security related matters. There has been wide scale criticism of the US Predator Programme, which landed several drone attacks on the Pakistani soil. While talking about the bill, its opponents also state that there is no mention of a stance against such occurrences in the document. All in all, the bill is rejected on the grounds that it is demeaning to the integrity of an independent nation state which had been the biggest victim of terrorism itself, and that the bill makes Pakistan largely dependent on the US when it comes to the implementation of national security policy.

I personally disagree with the critics on many points, whereas I also believe that the bill could have been made better in order to dispel some of the concerns that many people have when it comes to bilateral relations between the two countries. The bill states that the Pakistani military should be subservient to the civilian government- something which is a basic tenet for a successful democracy in the country, especially in the wake of several military dictatorships that have scarred the process of democracy for the past 50 years. The bill also lays down great emphasis on the 'soft' dimensions of combating terrorism, which are the provision of modern education to children through educational reforms, access to media and knowledge, provision of better healthcare to poor communities, promoting public-private partnerships and addressing various other problems faced by Pakistan. The socio-economic development indicators mentioned are imperative for building a strong fabric for a progressive and tolerant society, and the presence of these indicators will naturally tone down the extremist elements in the society. What is the problem with the document when most of the points it forwards are the objectives shared by the Pakistani government and the opposition? My personal criticism of the bill is only the lack of mention of the drone attacks on the Pakistani soil; the US should have condoned these attacks as a part of the bill, which would have made the critics believe that they are being dealt with on equal footing, and that the US will make substantive efforts to respect the national integrity of Pakistan. Apart from this point, I think the bill is a manifestation of a joint effort between the two countries to fight radicalism and underdevelopment by strengthening the institutions which are critical to development. Instead of criticizing, if the Pakistani circles endorse this joint venture and focus on the capacity building of the institutions in question, initiatives like this can do wonders for the long term development process in Pakistan.

Foreign Aid Dilemma


The international aid to developing countries as a means to enhance the process of development has been a big question in the development discourse itself. The question follows multiple steps of the aid disbursement: the need/estimation of aid to a country, the call for aid to different international leaders, provision of the aid and the funding gap, and finally the disbursement through various international and local institutions. Many foreign and social policy experts have brought into question the efficiency and effectiveness of foreign aid. On one hand, it can be referred to as a windfall of resources for the governments to increase their consumption levels, on the other, it can also be thought of as an indirect channel for economic growth through increasing the investment share of GDP.  In most of the developing countries, the government institutions lack accountability and transparency, due to which a major share of the aid received is lost to the rent seeking behavior of the state. When aid is earmarked to increase the investment share, by virtue of the weakness of the same institutions, the resources are not utilized effectively, even if they are utilized honestly. The foreign aid in the form of emergency humanitarian aid is a completely a different ball game, and it poses different questions to the way international aid is disbursed.

My argument is a different one: I believe that the way international institutions utilize foreign aid in a specific country is also marred by the various external factors associated with the functions of these institutions, namely international NGOs. 

In 2010, when Pakistan was hit by the worst floods in the history, an estimated damage to the infrastructure amounted to about $43 billion, which was roughly equal to a quarter of the GDP of the country. The floods affected around 21 million people directly, while leaving millions displaced with their livelihoods completely destroyed. Such a massive level of natural disaster in a country with an already weak infrastructure conjured up a storm of international discussions and conferences to provide the required humanitarian assistance in the wake of pre existing malnutrition, food insecurity, and weak social indicators in Pakistan. The UN called for a flood appeal, asking for $2 billion in the form of international aid for Pakistan, and despite the claims by all the international leaders, only $450 million was made available for the first three months of the emergency. This goes for the first three steps of international aid i mentioned in the first paragraph. Despite the mobilization of resources and human capital, there is always a big gap of funding which is sorely inadequate for the desired purpose of the international aid. Throughout the time of humanitarian assistance to the flood affected communities in Pakistan, the provision of aid as opposed to the required aid was around 70% (an estimate). Despite the funding gap for the actual emergency response, there was no inhibition of international agencies swarming into Pakistan with specialists and experts conducting researches and studies on the deteriorating levels of underdevelopment in the affected zones. This brings me back to my argument of the inefficiencies of the international institutions in creating a real impact. 

Although there was a need for more resources to tackle the disastrous situation given the floods and the weak government institutions (responsible for implementation of emergency programs), a huge chunk of the international aid was used to fund the human capital costs associated with the international agencies. Even the UN agencies use up almost 40% of the international aid to sponsor the direct support costs (DSC) which include the salaries of the international experts and national staff, management fees to the local NGOs, transportation costs, and various other costs required to maintain certain protocols. Having said that, it does not mean at all that the interventions of such institutions have no positive impact on the targeted populations. Despite of this situation, agencies like WFP ended up feeding millions of people who were rendered food insecure in the wake of the disaster, in the same way UNICEF was able to launch broad based programs addressing the issue of malnutrition in the children under the age of 12, likewise WHO launched initiatives on building capacities of the local health departments through advocacy programs. 

The question still remains: is it enough? When so many resources are being invested to investigate the inefficiencies of government institutions to actively engage in the process of development, and when there is an awareness on how international agencies burden the international aid with their associated expenses, why can not we change the course of development practice in such a way that it is both efficient and effective, while the impact on the targeted communities is sustainable. The need to focus more on building capacities of institutions in the developing countries is imperative. If there are enough resources to be spared for associated costs, then they should be channeled to teach the idea of sustainable development to social institutions while drawing from the experience that the international agencies have to offer. This approach can also curb the trust deficit between local and international institutions, and result in programmatic synergies vis-a-vis development interventions. Finally, a localized approach to the development question can make the developing countries be self sufficient in the long run (capacity building), and it will be easier for international agencies to withdraw and channel their resources and energies on other deserving countries. 

Wednesday, November 14, 2012

Paternalism for progress: Development of Canal Colonies in Punjab, Pakistan.


Colonialism has left deep rooted impact in many countries today. Centuries of expropriation and distortion of indigenous productive capacities combined with little social development have drastically changed the way countries operate today. As these societies attempt to develop their under developed state, many are handicapped by the state apparatus of the pre-colonial era. The long standing inequitable growth and inaccessibility of resources further inhibit any development initiatives. Punjab province of Pakistan is a relevant example for this development question, where development reforms were guided by political and socio-economic motives of the British Empire, and how they have affected the development process itself today. The late 19th century development concept of the 'canal colonies' introduced by the British Raj was an initiative to create a productive agrarian society in Punjab. Its implementation, however, follows a strategic path to harbor political support, and its analysis shows how its meaning has changed over time and the consequences that it brings for Pakistan today.

Punjab was completely barren at the time it was annexed by the British, however, the presence of five rivers posited a potential for developing a ‘model agricultural province’. Along with this, Punjab played a vital geo-political role as its loyalty could offer strong political support to the British. Thus, began a series of efforts to develop Punjab’s agricultural system along with the broader goal to maintain political security and stability. During the end of the 19th century, widespread utilitarian thought led many to conceive the sub-continent as ‘backward’ and in need for transforming its outmoded social and cultural practices in pursuit of ‘progress’. With more progress in the region, land was being transferred into the hands of informal money lenders who began to accumulate increasing ownership of land upon foreclosure of debts on mortgaged lands. The accumulation of wealth by these money lenders was seen as a threat to the empire. They feared that in a region where loyalty was imperative, this movement would undermine the very security and stability of the regime. The ‘Note on Land Transfer’ penned in 1895, explicitly takes note of this and says;”…a money lender can never take the place of the large ancestral landlord.” They lay the groundwork for the transition to canal colonies.

The famous BRB canal runs through the heart of present day Lahore
The idea was simple – the British would create an extensive network of villages and irrigation canals around the five rivers in Punjab and these regions would then be called the 'canal colonies'. The new settlement area was planned over 11 million acres of land with the landed rich to act as support for the beleaguered imperial state. More than 5 million acres of this ‘waste land’ was taken from original inhabitants by the Crown (or British State). Since propriety rights were a state formulated policy, the antecedent claims of the pastoral population was not recognized giving the state complete appropriation and utilization rights. The original inhabitants living in various clans and tribes, were given the names of janglis (illiterate) and were deemed to have no rights, culture or values and were driven off the land.

The construction of canal colonies lasted several decades, culminating in 1930. Punjab moved from being one of the poorest regions to the most agriculturally productive. The total area under cultivation increased sharply- 50 per cent from 1868 to 1921- and the proportion of canal irrigated area, from around 6 per cent to 36 per cent.7 The population rose by 18 percent between 1901 and 1911. This was met with a subsequent 22% increase in the urban population of these areas between 1911 and 19218. This entire process completely shifted the demography of the districts that constitute Pakistan today.

The entire act itself was much more complex than the simple action of providing water in the region. The twist arrives, when by official decree, the eligibility of these peasants for a canal colony was on account of being a ‘hereditary agriculturalist’. Hand in hand with this, the Land Alienation Act of 1900, was introduced which prevented the commercial castes (the informal money lenders) from acquiring land from the ‘incumbent agriculturalist’ tribes.

However, the pre-colonial landed aristocracy underpins the feudal system that we see in Pakistan today. The agricultural aristocracy continues, now as the feudal lords in these canal colonies. Over the decades, they have accumulated wealth and engaged in politics and military regimes. They now hold important positions in the state and military factions, thus thwarting any attempts at redistributing the disproportionate land holdings. Since 1947, there have been three wide scale unsuccessful attempts at land reforms in the country. The common view holds accountable the lack of enforcement mechanisms as a large number of those who sought to institutionalize them had profited from these canal colonies. This existing feudal system in most of rural Pakistan gives rise to a specific patron-client relationship which has far reaching implications vis-à-vis the socioeconomic and political domains governing the dynamics the canal colonies today. Despite working for the landlords for years and generations, the peasantry is not awarded property rights or access to means of production.

One could contrast these two centuries in the subcontinent to the Irish Land War. In late 19th century, rural Ireland faced similar tenancy laws by England and eventually led an agitation against them to revoke such laws. The agitation sought to improve the standing of tenant farmers and ultimately aimed for a redistribution of land to the tenants. Where the Irish eventually succeeded after a prolonged period of civil unrest, the subcontinent was just sowing seeds for a similar kind of labor and land misappropriation.

Conclusion
C.L. Tupper, who laid the foundations of Punjab’s customary law in 1880, said that, ‘a tribe
in the chains of its own customs, unrelaxed and unrefined, may still stand for centuries but a tribe lighted into the system of British administration, has in the guardianship of the governing body, the best possible chance of disusing savagery and learning the wisdom of civilized men’. However, over the decades to unfold, the canal colonies witnessed a contradictory economic pattern. Imperfect competition, unequal land holdings and limited innovation has thwarted potential for growth and increased the insecurity for the small scale farmers in Pakistan. The union of development and paternalism bequeathed a system that changed the very nature of how a nation’s development process unfolded. One could argue for faults in the implementation mechanism and not the idea. However, a concept that tears people away from the natural evolution and dismantles the very nature of their existence, also completely disregards the value of insurance and social kinship which could have strengthened the very same development process.








Saturday, October 13, 2012

Faces of Democracy


The notion of democracy is ubiquitously found in the international political discourse, and its significance has been perpetuated over the years. The lessons from the tyrannical reigns of the fascist and authoritarian regimes during the second world war made the importance of democracy known to the world in a political, economic and academic fashion. The international relations are governed by the principles of democracy to a large extent and the interactions between nation-states are based on these principles today. It would not be an understatement to say that democracy has become a universal good. The question still remains: what is democracy? Is it the freedom of political practice or the freedom to uphold ones religious values, or the freedom to ‘enforce’ one’s doctrines in order to yield other universal goods for the subjects of a democracy. The answer is too complicated and different for different countries; I believe there is no uniform definition of the concept that can reflect the breadth of the human experience in the political realm. For most complex societies, it is probably one of the freedoms bestowed upon them by virtue of belonging to a civilized society, whereas the origins of democracy go way back. The behavior of Paleolithic cultures even in the hunter-gatherer tribes to come to a consensus regarding decisions is actually a manifestation of democratic attitude.  At the end of the day, in my opinion, the process of democracy is the interplay of different institutions, and this process is largely governed by human behavior and the heritage of the political system in question.

For a country like Pakistan, the idea of a successful democracy had always been complicated and problematic. It would be way too much credit for the failing democratic institutions to assume that the Pakistani political system is democratic in its truest form. The Pakistani people elected their last government through parliamentary elections in 2008 and today the Western allies like the US endorse the contemporary government as a democratically elected one. Around 35% of the voting population participated in the elections, out of which a huge majority is the rural population and agricultural communities. The assumption that the elected government reflects the principles of a successful democracy is not a truism. Pakistani political system might have followed the ‘process’, but not the ‘philosophy’ of a true democracy. The concept many political scientists in Pakistan have come up with is the ‘infrastructure’ for democracy that is imperative for the successful implementation of a democratic model. This infrastructure is the confluence of different social, political and economic institutions working together in such a way that they influence the political opinions of the people of Pakistan and eventually influence the general human behavior. Ultimately the democracy has to come through the people and they are the ones who have to be absolutely clear on the philosophy for the success of democracy.

The problem with the infrastructure mentioned above is the power dynamics in Pakistan. The power structure in the country is largely determined by the interactions of different groups, which pre dominantly takes the shape of a patron-client relationship. In most rural areas of Punjab and Sindh, the people still bow down to their feudal lords, the clan leaders influence the political opinions of their respective clans and the tribal heads govern the tribal belt towards the North-Western Frontier.

Being from a political background and a rural area in Punjab myself, I know that the elections are most ‘celebrated’ by the rural population of Pakistan. At the same time, there is a complete indifference towards the manifestos of different political parties running, because the guiding principle of voting for the people is what the ‘patrons’ dictate to them. In the process, the concept of ‘one man one vote’ is negated altogether and the people from the rural areas, who do not have access to formal social institutions, end up relying on the social system that they have. For example, an electoral candidate only has to co-opt the village leaders or feudal lords for mass mobilization of the voters, and they never come down to the grassroots in order to convince individuals of their political objectives. This leads to a repetitive process of the same people coming into power again and again, and in most of the constituencies the parliamentary seats are referred to as ‘family seats’ of certain politicians. Having said all of that, it does not mean that the clan or tribal system is bad for these rural populations; on the contrary they are the informal social institutions that provide the strongest safety nets for the people. At the same time, however, if those people lack access to quality education, healthcare, and other social welfare provisions, these safety nets become detrimental for their overall human development. The urban populations on the other hand seldom vote on the election day since they are aware of the redundancy of the political process. Due to this vicious cycle of politics created by the institutions in question, coupled with the inefficient democratic institutions like political parties and relevant government departments, the democracy stays marred with obstacles and all these factors yield a sham or pseudo democracy.

There is a great need to introduce structural changes that will essentially provide the essential infrastructure for a successful democracy. Although one can mention several recommendations to do so but I believe there is a dire need to create linkages between informal and forma social institutions, and use the already existing social safety nets for the provision of quality social welfare to the populations that do not have access to them. At the same time, a long term investment in in quality education (starting with educational reforms) is imperative for the sustainability of the democratic infrastructure and the influence on the political philosophy of the populations in question. Still, as long as such structural change do not permeate the existing power structures, the results of any of the positive policy changes will be unknown to us.